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THE MISUSE DOCTRINE AND POST EXPIRATIONDISCRIMINATORY-AND EXORBITANT
PATENT ROYALTIES
THE PATENT MISUSE DOCTRINE

In a series of cases' the Supreme Court developed the doctrine
of patent misuse which denies relief to patentees who attempt to extend
the patent beyond the scope of the lawful grant. This doctrine originated
in patent infringement cases, which are litigated in a court of equity,
and follows the principle that equity will deny use of its powers to a
wrongdoer. Besides providing an affirmative defense to infringement
suits, the misuse doctrine has been extended to strip the patentee of his
exemption under the antitrust laws.' The economic concept of free
competition is implemented by the antitrust laws which prohibits
monopolies and monopolistic practices. However, the patent laws, by
granting a patentee the right to exclude others from making, using
or selling the invention, provide a lawful monopoly which is exempt
from the prohibition of the antitrust laws. This exemption is a limited
one and the Supreme Court has closely restricted the monopoly to
the scope of the patent grant.'
The misuse doctrine is applied as an equitable defense in patent
law infringement cases and also as an antitrust law counterclaim for
damages. To avoid confusion, it is important to distinguish between
the two applications of the doctrine. The consequences of a violation
of the antitrust laws are more severe than the sanctions under the
patent laws for abuse of a patent.4 An infringement proceeding in
which misuse is alleged does not always involve a question of antitrust
law and a patentee can be denied the right to enforce his patent for
1. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) ; Morton Salt Co.
v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495
(1942); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. v.
American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Pictures Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
2. 1955 ATT'Y. GEN NATL. Comm. ANTMrUST REP. 249.
3. Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
In this case, the Court enumerated the restrictions. First, the scope of every patent
is limited to the invention described in the patent grant. Second, the only effect of the
patent is that the patenttee receives the right to restrain others from manufacturing,
using or selling the invention. Third, the public interest take precedence over the
creation of private fortunes.
4. In a normal infringement suit, where the patentee is found to have misused his
patent, he will be denied the right to sue for infringement or for royalties due until
he has purged himself of the illegal activity. However, if the misuse reaches antitrust
proportions, then the patentee will also be subject to a counterclaim for treble damages.
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activity which falls short of an antitrust violation. However, when an
antitrust violation is asserted as a defense or counterclaim to an
infringement proceeding or to a claim for royalties, the defendant
must meet the standards of proof required by the antitrust laws.
Although not every misuse of the patent violates the antitrust laws,
every use of the patent that- violates the antitrust laws constitutes a
misuse of the patent.
Because the patent misuse doctrine has been applied to a variety
of activities,5 this note will be limited to the current developments in
relation to patent royalty practices. More specifically, this note will
survey the decisions dealing with post-expiration royalties,' discriminatory royalty rates, 7 and exorbitant royalty rates.'
POST

EXPIRATION ROYALTIES

For economic or technological reasons, a patentee may decide his
patent can be exploited most advantageously by licensing others to
make, use or sell the invention. The right to grant licenses is one of
the most valuable elements of the patent grant.' However, since this
right is not unlimited, a patentee, entering into a license agreement
providing for royalty payments which extend beyond the expiration
date of the patent, may be guilty of misuse of the patent. Basically,
there are two situations in which the validity of post-expiration
royalties may be questioned. First, a post-expiration agreement may
5.

Besides the patent royalty cases, the doctrine of patent misuse has been applied

as follows: International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)

(tying

arrangements) ; United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948)
(price
fixing) ; National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.
1943) (exclusive dealing) ; Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
382 U.S. 172 (1965) (intentional fraud in obtaining); Hartford Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 386, clarified, 324 U.S. 570 (1945) (acquisition practices); American
Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
902 (1959) (package licensing). For a general introduction to the misuse doctrine and
its antitrust aspect, see S. OPPENHEM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWs 755912 (1959); 1955 ATT'y GEN. NATL. Co,im. ANTITRUST REP. 223-260.
6. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) ; Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard
Concrete Wall, Inc. 367 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1966); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well
Surveys, Inc. 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965).
7. LaPeyre v. F.T.C., 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F.
Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966); Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F.Supp 9
(D. Alas.), modified, 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alas. 1965).
8. American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 359 F.2d 745 (1966).
9. See 1955 ATT'Y. GEN. NAT'L. Colim. ANTITRUST REP. 231.
The simple grant of a patent license-like the simple assignment of a patent
poses no antitrust problems. Indeed, the right to grant such licenses is one
of the major elements of value in the patent itself. It has long been judicially
recognized that limitations may be included in such licenses as to the nature
and scope of the rights which the patentee grants under his patent. These
limitations have as their basic purpose the description and the definition of
the rights which are conferred on the licensee.
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license the use of a single patent with the provision that royalty
payments are to extend beyond the period of the lawful patent grant.
Second, a patentee may license a package of patents at a non-diminishing royalty rate which is to continue until the expiration of the last
patent. For purposes of clarity the first situation will be designated as
a post-expiration royalty agreement and the second situation as a
non-diminishing royalty agreement.
History10
Dicta in two Supreme Court cases seem to indicate that a single
patent post-expiration royalty agreement is illegal and a package
license non-diminishing royalty rate agreement is legal. In Scott Paper
Co. v. Marculus Mfg. Co.," the Court in dicta said "any attempt" to
extend the patent monopoly beyond its expiration date would be
contrary to the policy and purpose of the patent laws. However, when
presented with a package licensing situation in Automatic Radio Mfg.
Co. v. Ha;eltine Research Inc.,2 where some of the patents involved
had expired prior to the termination date for the payment of royalties,
the Supreme Court upheld the royalty agreement. In this case, Hazeltine entered into a licensing agreement with Automatic Radio whereby
the latter was to pay royalties for the use of 570 patents and 200
applications. Under the agreement, which was executed in September
of 1942 for a term of ten years, Automatic Radio was to pay the
royalty, based on a percentage of its sales, whether or not it used
Hazeltine's patents. Automatic Radio refused to pay the royalties and
Hazeltine sued for the royalties due. Automatic Radio defended on the
ground that it was a misuse of the patent to require a licensee to pay
10. For a more comprehensive history of the development of post-expiration
royalties as a misuse see Comment, Validity of Patent License Provisions Requiring

Payment Of Post-Expiration.Royalties, 65 CoLum. L. REV. 1256 (1965); Comment,
Post Expiration Royalty Payments and Mandatory Package Licensing as Patent
Misuses, 11 VILL. L. REv. 382 (1966).

11. 326 U.S. 249 (1945). In this case the Court was presented with the question
of whether or not the assignor of a patent is estopped by virtue of his assignment
from defending a suit for infringement on the ground that the infringing device is that
of an expired patent. The Court held that such an estoppel would violate the policy

of the patent laws. The Court concluded by saying,
Hence any attempted reservation or continuation in the patentee. . . of the
patent monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal device employed,
runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws ...
It is thus apparent that the patent laws preclude the patentee of an expired
patent...

from recapturing any part of the former patent monopoly; for those

laws dedicate to all the public the ideas and inventions embodied in an expired
patent. They do not contemplate that anyone by contract or any form of
private arrangement may withhold from the public the use of an invention
for which the public has paid by its grant of a monopoly and which has been
appropriated to the use of all. Id. at 256.

12. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
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royalties based on its sales, even though none of the patents are used.
The Court upheld the agreement because it represented "the most
convenient method of fixing the business value of the privileges
granted by the licensing agreement." Arguably the dicta of the two
cases conflicts because in the Scott Paper case the Court is condemning
"'any attempt" to extend royalty payments past the expiration of the
patent but in Hazeltine the Court upholds non-diminishing royalty
agreements because of business convenience or necessity.
In two cases the Third Circuit, in dicta, declared that both nondiminishing and post-expiration royalty agreements constitute a misuse
of the patent grant." In American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass
Corp.," the court held that the patentee's refusal to grant a license
under one or more of its patents unless a license was taken under all
constituted a misuse of the patent monopoly. The court reasoned that
this practice was unlawful coercion and similar to illegal tying arrangements. However, the court went much further and in dicta declared
non-diminishing royalty rate agreements to be a misuse of the patent."
The post-expiration royalty problem was presented to the same
court in Ar-Tik Sys., Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc. 6 In this case, the
patentee sued a sub-licensee for royalties due after the expiration of
the patent. The licensing agreement contained a provision for the
continuation of royalties "regardless of the expiration of the patent."
The court declared post-expiration royalties to be a misuse of the
patent because they are contrary to the purpose and policy of the
patent laws. Therefore, the Third Circuit considers both non-diminishing and post-expiration royalty agreements to be a misuse of the patent.
Bridotte v. Thys Co.'
To resolve the confusion,"8 the Supreme Court granted a petition
for certiorari to a patent licensee who had been held liable for
royalties after some of the patents had expired. The Thys Company, a
13. Ar-Tik Sys., Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 302 F2d 496 (3d Cir. 1962);
American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
14. 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
15. Id. at 777. The court said:
We conclude also, and quite apart from all of the foregoing, that Paragraph
8(a) of Securit's Standard Licensing Agreement which provides that that
agreement shall continue "in full force and effect to the expiration of the
last to expire of any" of Securit's patents set out in "Schedule A" constitutes
a patent misuse for it extends the payment of royalties of patents under patents
which may expire to the expiration date of that patent most recently granted
to Securit.
16. 302 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1962).
17. 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
18. See Comment, Post Expiration Royalty Payments and Mandatory Package
Licensing as Patent Misuses, 11 VILL. L. REV. 382 (1966).
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patentee who was engaged in the manufacture and sale of patented
hop-picking machinery, sold machines to farmers and charged a yearly
royalty for the use of the machine. The royalty payments were to be
made over a period of seventeen years and were based on amount of
use and production by the farmer. The patentee had twelve patents,
seven of which were incorporated into the machine, and the agreement
licensed farmers to use all twelve of the patents plus any patents
pending on hop-picking devices.'" After the seven patents incorporated
into the machine had expired, two of the farmer licensees refused to
pay royalties. Thys Company sued to recover the royalties due. The
Supreme Court, reversing a judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington, held that the agreement for the payment of royalties after the
last patent incorporated into the machine had expired constituted a
misuse of the patent.
The Court, basing its decision on public policy, held the arrangement was analogous to patent tying agreements.2 An agreement of this
nature, the Court decided, runs contrary to the policy and purpose of
the patent laws because it would subject "the free market visualized
for the post-expiration period. . . to monopoly influences that have no
proper place there."'" The Court distinguished the Hazeltinw case
because not all of the patents had expired in that case, while in the
present case all of the patents incorporated into the machine had
expired prior to the termitanion date for the payment of royalties.22
Thus, the Court declined to extend Hazeltine to the point of extending
the lawful patent monopoly beyond the term of any of the patents in a
23

package.

19. All but one of the patents were scheduled to expire prior to the termination
of the agreement. Although the record is not clear as to whether or not the five patents

not incorporated into the machine were of any value to the farmers, it is clear that all
pertained to hop-picking. See Brief for Petitioners at 6, Brulotte v. Thys Co. 379 U.S. 29

(1964).
20. Id. at 33.
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate
with the leverage of that monopoly. But to use that leverage to project those
royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to
enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tieing the sale or use of the patented
article to the United States, 309 U.S. 436; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 664-665 and cases cited.
21. Id. at 32.
22. Id. at 33. The Court said:
Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine, 339 U.S. 827, is not in point. While some of
the patents under the license apparently had expired, the royalties claimed were
not for a period when all of them had expired.
23. The Court's reliance on Scott Paper while attempting to uphold the validity of
Hazcltihe seems to be inconsistent. In Scott Paper the Court proscribes "any" device
to extend the patent monopoly. In Hazeltine the Court approves extension of the patent
in a package licensing situation where not all of the patents have expired. This inconsistency seems to be the real root of the conflict in the circuit courts over the extent
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The Court's attempt to distinguish Hazeltine because not "all" of
the patents had expired in that case seems tenuous since not all of the
patents had expired in Brwlotte.2 4 The possibility exists that the court
did much more than merely distinguish Hazeltine; it may have placed
a severe limitation upon it. Although it is subject to contrary interpretation, footnote five(5)2" of the Court's opinion indicates that the

Court may be willing to prohibit extension of royalty payments beyond
the expiration of any of the patents. However, if the Court really wanted
to limit Ha-eltine, it is difficult to understand why it did not seize the
opportunity to decide the non-diminishing royalty question since it was
at least technically before the Court.
Post-Brulotte
Predictions were made that the Brulotte decision would be of
limited significance and would only be applied in a similar factual
situation of this unusual nature.2 6 However, a conflict, as to the effect
of Brulotte, has arisen between the Tenth and Sixth Circuits. The
Tenth Circuit held that it is not illegal to charge a non-diminishing
royalty rate for a package of patents even though some patents will
expire prior to the termination of the license agreement.2 7 In McCullough. Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc. (WSI),
questions of
of the holding in Bridotte. See McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F2d 381
(10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966). Cottra, Rocform Corp. v. AcitelliStandard Concete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1966).
24. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30 (1964).
The licenses issued to petitioners listed 12 patents relating to hop-picking
machines;2 but only seven were incorporated into the machines sold to and
licensed for use by petitioners.
In the footnote the Court said all but one of the twelve patents expired prior to the
termination of the agreement. All of the patents incorporated into the machine had
expired.
25. Id. at 33. In footnote five the Court said, "The petition for certiorari did not
in the questions presented raise the question of the effect of the expiration of any
of the patents on the royalty agreement."
26. 29 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEcToIN 122, 129-30 (1965).
27. McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966).
28. Id. Since the writing of this note there has been another decision involving
Well Surveys, Inc. which would indicate the practices constituting patent misuse were
not purged in 1956. See Well Surveys, Inc., v. Perfo-Log, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. 72,187
at g] 84,265 (W.D. Okla. June 26, 1967). This court, relying on Rocform and not
mentioning McCullough, held it was a misuse of the patent to license at a nondiminishing royalty rate when the "important" patent will be the first to expire during
the term of the license. The court did not file an explanatory opinion but issued only
findings of fact and conclusions of law. This decision was based on findings which were
not available to the court in McCullough. In Perfo-Log, the court determined the patent
about to expire (the Swift patent) was the "important and crucial" patent in the
licensor's various packages and that the patentee was engaged in mandatory package
licensing.
The finding of mandatory package licensing would have been sufficient to support
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validity, infringement, and misuse of patents relating to a method of
logging oil wells were presented. WSI charged its licensees a flat
percentage of the receipts of the operations whether or not the patents,
some of which had expired and others of which would expire during
the life of the agreement, were used. When WSI filed suit against
McCullough for infringement of its patents, McCullough, in addition to
other defenses, asserted that WSI had misused its patents by collecting
royalties on expired patents.
Relying on its determination of a factual similarity with Hazeltine, the Tenth Circuit denied the defense of misuse of patents in a nondiminishing royalty agreement.2" The court believed that Hazeltine
was the leading case upholding the validity of a voluntary package
license agreement in which some of the patents expire during the life
of the agreement and was controlling. The decision in this case had
been held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in
Brulotte. However, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Brulotte because
in the case at bar not all of the patents had expired, while in Brulotte
the license agreement had attempted to extend the period for paying
royalties beyond the expiration of the last patent incorporated into the
machine. Therefore this court interpreted Brulotte as upholding the
validity of non-diminishing royalties in a package license situation."0
the holding of misuse. However the court went much further and made the following
broad statement:
A package license agreement which provides that that agreement shall continue in full force and effect until the expiration date of the last patent to
expire under which the patent is granted, constitutes patent misuse because
it extends the payment of royalties under patents which will expire to the
expiration date of the patents which will expire later. Id. at ff 84,272.
Based on the law as it exists at present, so broad a statement can hardly be valid. It
would seem clearly to apply to mandatory non-diminishing royalty agreements. However,
the statement would be invalid if applied to voluntary non-diminishing royalty
agreements. See discussion notes 35-39 infra.
29. McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381, 409 (10th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966). The court in discussing the package license situation
said:
The validity of such an agreement was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, .... The
facts in that case are almost identical with the facts in this case. There, as here,
the license agreements offered by the patentee were of the so called package
type and included all of its present and future patents. The package licenses
were offered for a flat percentage of the licensee's operations whether or not
any of the patents were used. Then, as here, some but not all of the patents
had expired before the license agreement in question was executed and more
of them would expire during the effective period of the agreement.
30. Id. at 410. The court distinguished Brulotte because ". . . the license agreement
under consideration attempted to extend the period for paying royalties beyond the date
of the expiration of the last of the patents covered by the agreement. That is not the
case here or in Hazeltine." The specific language of Brilotte would seem to justify the
Tenth Circuit's interpretation. In Brudotte, the Court distinguished Hazeltine because
"[w]hile some of the patents under that license apparently had expired, the royalties
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The Sixth Circuit applied Brulotte to condemn a multi-patent
license for lack of royalty reduction when the most important patent
expired."l This court, in Rocfornb Corp. v. Acitelli Standard Concrete
TVall, Inc., 2 placed a different interpretation upon the extent of the
holding in Brulotte and held that a license agreement which had the effect of extending royalty payments for a patent which was about to
expire by grouping it with others was illegal. Rocform Corporation,
which held a patent on a "Prefabricated Wall Form" and other patents
relating to the process of pouring concrete basement walls, grouped all
of its patents into one package and licensed them as the "Rocform
System." Although the crucial patent was about to expire, the other
patents were of longer duration.
The Rocform Corporation argued that this arrangement was legal
because Bridotte upheld the validity of an arrangement where royalties
were continued until the last necessary patent had expired. The Sixth
Circuit regarded this contention as too broad and distinguished Brulotte
because in the present case the patents were not incorporated into a
machine and the most important patent had been grouped with others
for "leverage." 3 3 The court's attempt to distinguish the two cases
because the patents were not incorporated into a machine seems
tenuous. The patents in the Rocform case were incorporated into the
"Rocform System." Pradtically there appears to be no difference
between incorporating patents into a machine and incorporating them
into a system. A package license is involved in both situations and it
would seem to make little difference whether the combination is called
a "system" or a "machine." Whether it is a machine or a system, the
end result is one item composed of various patents which contribute to
the overall success of the operation.
The Sixth Circuit's attempt to distinguish the Rocform situation
from Bruflotte, because the most important patent had been grouped
with others for "leverage," ignores the Supreme Court's approval of
using the leverage of a patent to exact royalties as high as the patentee
claimed were not for a period when all of them had expired." Brulotte v. Thys

Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).

31. Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678 (6th
Cir. 1966).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 681.
We believe this is too broad a contention. We do not deal here (as did the
Supreme Court in Brulotte v. Thys Co. ,supra) with the sale of a piece of
machinery which incorporated a number of patents. Rather we deal with a
licensing arrangement where one important patent (about to expire) is grouped
with others of longer duration for"leverage."
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can negotiate.84 Also, this court misinterpreted the Supreme Court's
analogy to tying arrangements. By interpreting this analogy as applying to a voluntary package license situation,3 5 the Sixth Circuit ignores
the Supreme Court's approval of voluntary package licensing." The
Sixth Circuit may have failed to recognize the Supreme Court's previous
distinction between mandatory package licensing and voluntary package licensing." Patent tying arrangements are illegal because they
are an attempt to restrain competition by extending the lawful patent
monopoly to an unpatented article."8 A mandatory package situation
is very analogous because the patentee is refusing to license one
patent unless the licensee accepts patents of less value; thus he is
attempting to use a strong patent to restrain competition in a weak
patent area. The Court has said that "[t]he patent monopoly of one
invention may no more be enlarged for the exploitation of a monopoly
34. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate
with the leverage of that monopoly. But to use that leverage to project those
royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to
enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tieing the sale 'or use of the patented
article to the purchase or use of unpatented ones.
35. In the Rocform case, the court did not make a decision as to whether this was
a voluntary package license agreement or coercive mandatory package licensing. Since
the court based its finding of misuse on an attempt to illegally extend the patent, it
appears there was insufficient evidence as to the element of coercion. The appellant
(Rocform Corporation) contended that the license agreement was a mandatory
packaging agreement for interlocking patents related to producing one product and hence
valid. If the agreement was a mandatory package agreement for interlocking patents, it
would be treated the same as a voluntary package license agreement.
36. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
The Court proceeded on the assumption that this was a voluntary package licensing
arrangement. Although Automatic Radio had asserted this was a mandatory package
licensing arrangement, it did not press the point on appeal and there was nothing
available in the record to support the assertion. However, it appears obvious that
Hazeltine was actually engaged in the illegal practice of mandatory package licensing.
justice Douglas who alluded to this fact in his dissent, appears to have appraised realistically the actual factual setting.
37. Package licensing is the practice of tying in a license under one patent with
the grant of a license under one or more other patents. Mandatory package licensing,
which is a misuse of the patent monopoly, is a refusal to license a single patent unless
the licensee accepts the whole package at package rates. For an example of mandatory
package licensing, see American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769
(3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959); Hazeltine Research, Inc., v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill.
1965). For a complete discussion of mandatory
package licensing see Comment, Post Expiration Royalty Payments and Mandatory
Package Licensing as Patent Misuses, 11 VILL. L. RaV. 382 (1966). Voluntary package
licensing exists when a patentee will grant one, or all, or any number of his patents
at different rates. See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 399 U.S.
827 (1950).
38. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Morton Salt
Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495
(1942) ; Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938) ; Carbice Corp. v. American
Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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for another, . . . than for the exploitation of an unpatented article,
....
."'I There was no evidence in the Rocform case to indicate that

the patentee would have refused to grant a license for the patent in
suit as a separate item and at a royalty rate which was different from
the rate charged for the entire package. Therefore, the element of
coercion is lacking because the licensee had the choice of accepting a
license under one or all of the patents.
The dissenter in Rocform thought the majority had erroneously
assumed that some part of the license fee, after expiration of the main
patent, must necessarily be attributed to the expired patent.4" The
dissent's argument seems to be consistent with the voluntary package
licensing cases which do not assume that part of the license fee must
be attributed to the expired patents. Relying on McCulloug, and the
language of Brulotte, the dissent argued there was no misuse of the
patent unless the license agreement extended beyond the last of the
patents to expire.
There appears to be no justification for distinguishing between
post-expiration and non-diminishing royalty agreements. Post-expiration royalties are an illegal attempt to control that which is not
protected by the patent laws." These arrangements run contrary to
the purpose and policy of the patent laws. One purpose of the patent
laws is to encourage invention by guaranteeing the inventor that he will
be justly rewarded for his contributions to society. Another purpose
is to facilitate release of inventions into the public domain. Established
public policy requires that public benefit take precedence over reward
to the inventor.4 2 Since the effect of both mandatory and voluntary
non-diminishing royalty agreements is also to control that which is not
protected by the patent laws, these agreements should likewise be
illegal.
Voluntary non-diminishing royalty agreements have been held
valid because of business convenience or necessity.4" The patentees
argue that when a large number of patents are involved it is impossible
to make a continuing adjustment in license rates as various patents
expire and new patents are added to the package. However, with the
39. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 459 (1940).
40. Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc., 367 F.2d 678, 682
(6th Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion).
41. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964). The Court said:
. we conclude that a patentee's use of a royalty agreement that projects
beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se. If that device
were available to patentees, the free market visualized for the post-expiration
period would be subject to monopoly influences that have no proper place there.
42. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
43. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
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availability of modern methods of accounting, it is difficult to understand why courts continue to accept this argument. There is no reason
to assume that patentees cannot assign a value to each patent and
arrange a decreasing royalty on the basis of this value.
The possibility exists that a distinction should be made between
licensing consumers and licensing manufacturers to incorporate the
patents in their manufactured products. Justice Harlan attempted to
make this distinction in his dissent to the Bridotte opinion. 44 He
expressed the opinion that free use would not be restricted when
consumers entered into post-expiration agreements with the licensee
because there would be no substantial restriction on the use of the
idea by other manufacturers. However, post-expiration licensing agreements between patentees and manufacturers should be invalid because
the agreement would "restrict the manufacturer's exploitation of the
idea after it falls into the public domain." When the royalty agreement
between the patentee and the consumer licensee is based solely on use,
the distinction between consumers and manufacturers appears to be
valid. Upon expiration of the patent, the consumer licensee would be
free to discontinue use of the patent and buy from another manufacturer. However, exploitation of the patented idea after it entered the
public domain was restricted in Bridotte since the agreement provided
for the payment of a minimum royalty regardless of use.4" Since the
licensees were obligated to continue paying the original patentee, they
would be reluctant to increase costs by buying from another manufacturer. Thus, the use of the idea would be restricted after the patent
had entered the public domain. Justice Harlan based his dissent on the
proposition that the agreement between the Thys Company and the
farmers was nothing more than a long term installment contract. Therefore, post-expiration royalty agreements between patentees and consumer licensees should be valid only if they are based solely on use since
the effect then is the same as a long term installment contract.
DISCRIMINATORY ROYALTY RATES

Historically it has been a principle of patent law that a patentee
may charge as high a royalty as he can negotiate for his patent. But
today a patentee, who charges a higher royalty rate to one licensee
than he charges other licensees, may find he has misused his patent
and violated the antitrust laws. Discriminatory royalty rates have
44. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 34 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
45. Id. at 29. "Under that license there is payable a minimum royalty of $500
for each hop-picking season or $3.33% per 200 pounds of dried hops harvested by the
machine, whichever is greater."
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recently been held to violate the Sherman Act when the practice is
pursuant to an unlawful combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or an unlawful attempt to monopolize trade and may also be
condemned as an unfair method of competition under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.46 There has been a flurry of judicial
activity resulting from royalty rate discrimination in the shrimppeeling and canning industry."' The discussion will be limited to the
judicial activity arising from this factual situation.
FactualBackground
The Peelers Company 8 is engaged in the business of manufacturing, leasing, and selling patented shrimp-peeling and processing
machinery. The ownership and control of the Peelers Company is
essentially the same as that of Grand Caillou Packing Company which
is engaged in the business of canning shrimp and other seafood
products. The patent on the shrimp-peeling machinery was first issued
in 1947 and the machines were constructed in sufficient volume for
use in the Grand Caillou plant. The machinery was first offered on
the market in 1949. Prior to the invention, the canning of raw shrimp
had been limited entirely to the Louisiana and Gulf Coast areas and
shrimp-peeling was done by hand
labor. The shrimp on the Gulf
Coast area were of a larger variety than on the Pacific Coast, the other
source of supply, with resultant economy in the labor cost of peeling
by hand.
In order to determine the basis for a royalty charge, Peelers
Company engaged an expert in "shrimp analysis and production" to
compare the relative costs of peeling shrimp by hand and by machine.
On the basis of this analysis a rental charge of fifty five cents per
unit increase, that is per 100 cycles of the machine, was determined
as the proper royalty to afford a reasonable return to the patentee and
46. LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 5th Cir. 1966).
47. LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966); Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260
F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966); Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9
(D. Alas.), modified, 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alas. 1965).
48. Although the same patentee is involved in the cases which follow, the name
changes as the result of changes of business form. For purposes of clarity the patentee
will be designated as the Peelers Company. See Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 9, 11 (D. Alas.), inodified, 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alas. 1965).
The plaintiff Laitram Corporation is a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of Louisiana with its principal place of business in New Orleans.
It is the successor to the Peelers Company, a partnership in commendam. ...
The Peelers Company was a successor in interest to Peelers, Inc., a Louisiana
corporation....
Ownership and control of these organizations has always been vested in some
six individual members of the LaPeyre family.

. .

. These same individuals

have also retained ownership and control of... Grand Caillou Packing Company....
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a substantial saving to lessees of the machines. The success of the
machines was immediate and it became necessary for canners to use
machines in order to compete in the industry.
In the early 1950's, it was discovered that shrimp canning on the
Northwest Coast was commercially feasible and the Peelers' machinery
could be adapted for use on the smaller species of shrimp. In 1956,
Peelers entered into negotiations with canneries in Washington, Oregon,
and Alaska to lease machines at a royalty rate of one dollar and ten
cents per unit increase. The rate charged the Northwest canners was
based on the same labor cost saving analysis as was applied to the
Gulf Coast canners. Because the Northwest shrimp were a smaller
species and since it took the same amount of hand labor to peel one
small shrimp as it did to peel one large Gulf Coast Shrimp, the new
machine saved the Northwest canners at least twice the labor cost per
unit weight of shrimp."
LaitramCorp. v. King Crab, Inc."
The Laitram Corporation 5 brought an action for infringement
of its patented shrimp-peeling machinery. King Crab defended on the
grounds that the plaintiff had misused its patent and violated the
antitrust laws by charging the Northwest canners royalty rates double
the amount charged to the Gulf Coast canners. The plaintiff argued the
double rate was proper because a patentee is not required to license
and the rate was inconsistent with the benefits bestowed upon the
licensee. In essence, the Laitram Corporation was arguing that its
rates were proportionate to the labor saved and that nature, not the
plaintiff, had created the competitive disadvantage.
In its first opinion, 2 the court held the discriminatory rates
constituted a misuse of the patent monopoly and violated the antitrust
laws. 5" However, in its subsequent modified opinion, the court decided
49. Id. at 16.
The evidence also disclosed that consideration was not given in fixing such
double rate to what is known as the "yield" of shrimp in the canneries, that
is, the amount of canned shrimp which would be produced from 100% of raw
head-on penaeid shrimp, which was found to be 33%, and the amount of canned
shrimp produced from 100% of raw head-on pendalid shrimp, which was found
to be from 11% to 17%.

50. Id.
51.- See note 48 for the relationship between Laitram Corporation and Peelers
Company.
52. Laitram Corp. v. King Crab. Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9 (D. Alas.), modified,

245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alas. 1965).
53. To support its holding of a violation of the antitrust laws, the court relied
on United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd,
347 U.S. 521 (1954). In this case the court held that price discrimination in the leasing
of shoe manufacturing machines which aided in monopolization or an attempt to
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there was no evidence of an antitrust violation but that an antitrust
violation was not necessary for a determination of misuse of the patent.
Therefore, the court decided that Laitram had misused the shrimppeeling machine patent but the misuse was not so great as to warrant
finding an antitrust violation.
In this case the court seemed to be applying antitrust principles
to a patent case. The holding of misuse was based on the broad
proposition that any use of the patent monopoly which restrains or
injures competition is not justified by the patent grant. 4 But so
general a principle can hardly be valid because the very nature of
the patent grant is anti-competitive. When the use of a patent restrains
competition, this restraint does not constitute a misuse unless the
restraint is outside the restraint of trade permitted by the patent laws.
Since the Federal Trade Commission, in a proceeding before it on
these same facts, had already found a violation of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act the court would seem to be justified in
holding the patent had been misused." Because the court held that
evidence of an antitrust violation is not necessary to a finding of
misuse, " it did not pass on the question of whether or not an antitrust
violation had occurred. Apparently the misuse was based on the
finding of a restraint of competition which did not reach antitrust
proportions. This reasoning would be clearly erroneous because carried
to its logical conclusion it would greatly impair the benefits of a
patent. Any time a patentee exercises his right to exclude, he is
monopolize trade or commerce was not justified by the patent laws, but in effect violated
§ 2 of the Sherman Act. However, in its subsequent modified opinion, the court in
Laitrant distinguished United Shoe because restraint of competition in the sale and
leasing of machines was different from restraint of competition on the product from
use of the machines. See Laitram v. King Crab, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D. Alas.),
modifying, 244 F. Supp. 9 (D. Alas. 1965). The court said:
Moreover, the patent misuse in the United Shoe Machinery Corp. case was
found by the court to be with relation to leases of its machinery. In the case
at bar there was no evidence with respect to restraining competition of plaintiff's peeling machines, but rather the effect of such price discrimination upon
the product of such machines, being canned shrimp.
54. Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9, 14 (D. Alas.), inodified
245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alas. 1965).
It is held by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Morton Salt.
that the use of a patent monopoly to restrain competition... is not within the
monopoly granted by the patent and is contrary to the public policy of the
United States ...
Later the court quoted from Conunissioner Elman's concurring opinion in Grand Caillou
... refusal to treat the Northwest and Gulf coast shrimp canners on equal
terms is an abuse of monopoly power in that plaintiff has "substantially and
unjustifiably injured competition in the shrimp canning industry." Id. at 17.
55. See discussion notes 57-61 infra.
56. Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alas.), nodifying,
244 F. Supp. 9 (D. Alas. 1965).
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restraining competition to some degree because others in the industry
are prevented from competing with him.
LaPeyre v. FTC5"
In the Grand Caillou case, 8 the F.T.C. issued a cease and desist
order against Peelers because discriminatory rates were an "unfair
method of competition", violating section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act."9 Writing for the majority, Commissioner MacIntyre
said that there were two species of unlawful activity-"[a]cts performed to gain, maintain, and extend a patent based monopoly and
acts constituting an abuse of monopoly power.""0 The majority felt
the real reason for the discriminatory rate "was to protect and foster
their own interests as shrimp canners by inhibiting the shrimp canners
packing the. . shrimp of the Northwest."'"
For the Commission to hold that a patentee who uses his patent
monopoly to protect his own interest has abused his monopoly power,
is clearly inconsistent with the rights inherent in the patent grant. The
patent grants the patentee the exclusive right to make, use or sell his
invention. It would seem that the patentee's attempt to protect his own
interest would be inherent in the right to exclude. One of the purposes
of the patent laws is to encourage invention by protecting the patentee's
interest in the patent for the period of the patent grant. Giving the
patentee the right to exclude guarantees the successful implementation
of this purpose.62
In LaPeyre v. FTC,6" the Fifth Circuit upheld the F.T.C. cease
and desist order because there was sufficient evidence to show that the
discriminatory rates had the tendency to hinder competition unduly
and because a lawful monopolist has a duty to avoid inflicting competitive injury on a class of customers.64 The court's holding pertaining
to the competitive injury on competition seems to be inconsistent with
the natural effect of the patent grant. Whenever a patentee exercises
his right to exclude, there is always the possiblity that competition may
57. 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).
58. Grand Caillou Packing Co., No. 7887 (F.T.C., June 4, 1964).
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a) (1), 45(a) (6) (1964).
60. Grand Caillou Packing Co., No. 7887 (F.T.C., June 4. 1964).
61. Id.
62. The LaPeyre case involved more than simple exclusion. The patentee was also
licensing the ues of the patent. However see discussion notes 64-65 infra which equates
exclusion and royalty rates.
63. 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).
64. Id. at 120. The court said:
Conceptually, then, the problem of this case is not one of Robinson-Patmantype discrimination, but the duty of a lawful monoplist to conduct its business
in such a way as to avoid inflicting competitive injury on a class of customers.
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be hindered and thereby injured. Therefore, carried to its logical
conclusion, the competitive injury argument, if it is construed as
broadly as the words appear to justify, would seem to place a severe
restriction upon the rights of a patentee.
For various economic or technological reasons, a patentee may
decide to license others to manufacture or use his patent. Absent a
conspiracy to restrain competition, the courts have been unwilling to
prohibit a patentee from granting a license to one manufacturer or
part of an industry because there is nothing in the patent grant which
requires a patentee to grant a license to all who request it. Conceivably,
there is no logical distinction between discriminatory rates and discriminatory licensing because the ultimate effect of both is to hinder
competition to some degree. Whenever a patentee licenses only one or
a few manufacturers in an industry, the unlicensed manufacturers will
be placed at a competitive disadvantage as to the particular patent
in question. The same competitive disadvantage exists when a patentee
licenses some manufacturers at higher rates than others.
There appears to be no justification for the Fifth Circuit's holding
that a lawful monopolist has the duty to avoid inflicting competitive
injury on a class of customers. The court failed to explain why a
patentee has this duty. The court may have been attempting to apply
Robinson-Patman Act standards to discriminatory lease rates. However,
section 2(a) of the Clayton Act"5 applies only to "sales" of "commodities." A patent license is not a sale of a commodity; it is an
agreement not to sue for practice of the patent.
The F.T.C. held conflicting views as to the motive for the difference in rates. " The majority said the petitioners were trying to
protect their own interests as shrimp canners (Grand Caillou) from
the competition of the Northwest canners. Commissioner Elman was of
the opinion the petitioners were simply attempting to maximize their
profits and charging what the market would bear. The Fifth Circuit
felt it was unnecessary to resolve these contrary findings as to motive.
However, in this particular situation it would seem that motive would
be of some practical importance and that Commissioner Elman's view
of the motive was correct. If petitioner's desire was to protect Grand
Caillou from competition, then surely it would have refused to license
any other canner. Such a course of action could have resulted in
65. Clayton Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 730.
Sec. 2(a) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce..
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality....
66. LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Grand Caillou's being the only shrimp canner in the United States for
the seventeen year period of the patent grant." Thus, the fact that
Grand Caillou licensed others indicates it was interested in maximizing
profits and not in restraining competition. The fact that the patentee
initiated the agreements with the Northwest canners68 would seem to
indicate a willingness to increase rather than decrease competition
because prior to the invention of the machines shrimp canning in the
Northwest was not commercially feasible. 9
Peelers Co. v. Wendff°
The Peelers Co. case involved eleven claims for treble damages
which were all based on alleged violations of the Sherman Act. The
jury found the defendant (Peelers Company) had violated section 2
of the Sherman Act by single firm monopolization in excess of the
patent monopoly. Because the factual setting and parties were identical,
two actions were joined in a single trial-leading to the Peelers opinion.
The first action was a suit tried by a jury for violation of the Sherman
Act and involved the question of treble damages. The second
action7 was an infringement suit by Peelers Company against the
defendants for infringing the patented shrimp-peeling machinery. The
defendants charged patent misuse, and the parties stipulated a nonjury determination of the misuse question.
In the first case the district court said that since the same facts
had been found by the F.T.C. in LaPeyre, the jury could properly have
found that the following facts were proved by a preponderance of
the evidence:
(1) the defendants had no reasonable business necessity or
67. Id. at 119.
The installation of the machines so dramatically lowered the peeling cost that
to Gulf Coast canners it became necessary to have their use in order to stay
in the shrimp canning business.

68. Id.

In the latter part of 1953, James M. LaPeyre traveled to the Vest Coast and
visited several individuals connected with the fishing industry for the purpose
of determining the potential for petitioners' machines in that area.
69. Id. In this case the court said, "Prior to the availability of petitioners' shrimp
peeling machinery in 1949, the domestic canners, who were then all located in the Southern part of the United States, utilized hand labor for peeling shrimp." See also Laitram
Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9, 11 (D. Alas.), modified, 245 F. Supp.
1019 (D. Alas. 1965). In this case the court said, "[p]reviously [sic] to this invents ,n
shrimp canning of raw shrimp had been confined entirely to the Louisiana and
Gulf Coast areas, canning a variety of shrimp."
70. 260 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966).
71. This part of the case will not be discussed because the court held Peelers to
be estopped to deny misuse since misuse had been determined in the Laitram case.
For a discussion of the validity of this holding of misuse, see the previous analysis
notes 50-57 supra.
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justification for imposing unequal lease rates for the use of
their machinery; (2) in all particulars relevant to equal rates
claimants and their competitors were similarly situated; (3)
the lease rates were an important expense factor in the production costs of claimants and their competitors; and (4) the
rates imposed by defendants were unequal and caused substantial impairment of competition by claimants in the sale
of food processed on defendants' machinery.72
On the basis of these facts, the jury could reasonably reach the conclusion that the defendant had unlawfully exceeded its patent monopoly
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
In its instructions to the jury, the court made it clear that royalty
rate discrimination in itself would not be sufficient for a violation of
the Sherman Act; there must also be an unreasonable impairment or
suppression of competition." To negate this requirement, the defendant argued that the relevant market was the shrimp processing
machinery market. However, since the leasing rates charged by the
defendant caused the impairment or suppression of competition in the
shrimp canning industry, the court held the relevant market to be the
canned shrimp market. The court reached its decision on the relevant
market by reasoning that the Sherman Act does not confine itself to a
certain class of customers but is designed to protect all who are
made victims of the unlawful conduct.
In any complicated case where a jury is involved it may not be
possible to find the motivation behind the jury's decision. In this case
the court made it quite clear to the jury they were to relate all of the
instructions to each other. However, it does appear that some of the
instructions to the jury could have been misleading. The jury was
instructed that the Sherman Act prohibits monopolizing in excess of the
lawful patent monopoly and monopolizing was defined as the "power
to exclude competitors." 4 If by this instruction the court meant to say
the exercise of power to exclude is necessarily in excess of the patent
monopoly, this instruction would be contrary to what the Constitution
72. Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193, 197 (W.D. Wash. 1966). The court
used the LaPeyre case only to show that the jury's findings were not clearly erroneous
and could reasonably be supported by the evidence.

73. Id. at 193.
74. Id. at 196. Monopolizing was defined in the jury instructions as follows:
"Monopolizing is the acquisition or retention of power to control prices, or to exclude
competitors in interstate commerce in commodities sold or distributed in the same
market. The power to monopolize does not necessarily require that entire control of
pricing or competition be acquired of the market in a particular commodity. The
Sherman Act prohibits the monopolizing, in excess of lawful patent monopoly, of any

part of the market for any product in interstate trade or commerce."
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and patent laws expressly give to a patentee.7 5 Congress provided
that "[e]very patent shall contain.

. .

a grant to the patentee . . . for

the term of seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make, use,
and vend the invention or discovery. . . ."" It seems illogical to say
that, although a patentee has the power to exclude, his exercise
of this power constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act."
The court correctly instructed the jury that recovery could not be
based merely on a finding of discriminatory rates-that an essential
element of recovery was proof of an unreasonable impairment or
suppression of competition. But it is in this area that the real problem
exists. The previous cases" involving the shrimp-peeling machine
patents said the discriminatory lease rates caused the impairment
of competition. But this seems to be the result of a misinterpretation
of the facts and of the rights and obligations of a patentee. The facts of
this case disclose that prior to the invention shrimp canning in the
Northwest was not commercially feasible and, in fact, it was only the
invention that made shrimp canning in this area a possibility.' The
question then becomes one of whether or not a patentee has an obligation to use his patent to create a competitive situation. By saying a
patent owner has the duty to conduct his business in such a manner as
to avoid inflicting competitive injury on a class of customers does not
mean a patent owner has the duty to create a competitive condition
where a non-competitive situation already exists.
The jury had the opportunity to find Peelers in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act for an unlawful combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.8 " It would seem that this would have
75. U.S. COxsT. art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have Power. . .; [tlo promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ......
76. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
77. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
See also 1955 AT''Y. GEN. NAT'L. Coml . ANTITRUST REP. 226 where the Committee said:
...the sound rule that monopoly power individually acquired solely through
a basic patent, or aggregation of patent grants should not by itself constitute
monopolization in violation of Section 2 [of Sherman Act]. It would be paradox
to encourage individual invention by grant of a patent and then penalize that
temporary monopoly by deeming it "monopolization."
78. LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966); Laitram Corp. v. King Crab,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9 (D.Alas.), modified, 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D.Alas. 1965).
79. See note 70 supra.
80. Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193, 195 (W.D. Wash. 1966).
The claims were presented for consolidated jury trial on the contentions of
the parties and the issues specified in the final pretrial order. Upon the stated
contentions and issues recovery by any one or more of the claimants was
possible under any one of the following bases of recovery: (1) restraint of
trade by a combination of defendants in violation of Section 1 of the Act;
(2) monopolizing in violation of Section 2 of the Act 'by a combination of
defendants; (3) monopolizing by a single defendant; (4) attempting to mono-
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been the appropriate charge under which the patentee could have been
found to have violated the Sherman Act. However, the jury did not
find a violation of section 1; therefore, it seems proper to assume there
was no evidence of a combination or conspiracy. As suggested above,
it is rather difficult to justify a finding of monopolization in restraint
of trade under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Conceivably this finding
was based on misleading instructions8 and on a misunderstanding
of the obligation imposed under the patent monopoly.82 The patent
grant gives the patentee a lawful monopoly and, as pointed out
previously, it would be illogical to grant the patentee the power to
exclude and then hold the exercise of this power violates the antitrust
laws.
The discriminatory royalty cases seem to misinterpret the rights
of a patentee and prohibit the activity in which he should be entitled
to engage. In fact, the series of cases resulting from the shrimppeeling situation seems to demonstrate a misuse of the misuse doctrine.
For example, in Laitram, the misuse was based on a competitive
disadvantage but the court failed to consider that the necessary result
of a patent grant is a competitive advantage to the patentee and his
licensees. The court in the Peelers case, by finding a violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act, seemed to confuse the lawful patent
monopoly with the traditional antitrust concept of monopoly. While the
traditional monopoly takes something from society, the patent monopoly is based on a contribution to society and therefore is not a
monopoly in the antitrust sense of the term.
In the LaPeyre case, the court at least attempted to distinguish
between a competitive disadvantage to a class of customers and a
competitive disadvantage to competitors. However, this court failed to
distinguish between the situation where the competitive disadvantage
already exsits and the situation where the patentee creates the competitive
disadvantage among a class of its customers. Although a lawful monopolist may have the duty to conduct his business in such a manner as to avoid
inflicting competitive injury on a class of customers, this does not mean
polize by a single defendant; (5) attempting to monopolize by a combination of

defendants.
81. See discussion notes 74-76 mipra.
82. 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 318 (1959-60).
Thus, although the patent comes within the literal definition of a monopoly
-the right to sell alone-it is far different from the type of monopoly against
which the antitrust policy and its common law predecessors were directed.
For historically a "monopoly" connoted the giving of an exclusive right to
that which the public had previously freely enjoyed. In a patent, however,
the rights relate by definition only to that which the patentee has added to
the sum of human knowledge.
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he has the duty to create competition where a non-competitive situation
already exists.
EXORBITANT ROYALTIES

Generally a patentee is entitled to charge as high a royalty as he
is able to negotiate.8 3 However, Supreme Court dicta have indicated
this right is not unlimited when exercised by patentees in combination. 4 Also, dicta in a recent decision by the Seventh Circuit indicate
there may be a new trend developing in the area of patent royalty
rates. At least in this Circuit, an undisputed showing of exorbitant
and oppressive royalty rates involving the bulk of the industry accompanied by an increase in selling price may constitute a misuse of
the patent and price fixing in violation of the antitrust laws. The
discussion will be limited to the reasoning underlying this new
development.
American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovico, Inc. (APECO )83
In the APECO case the court discussed the criteria which should
be taken into consideration in determining whether or not exorbitant
royalties are a misuse of a patent and a violation of the antitrust laws.
The case arose from a suit filed against Rovico, Inc. for infringing the
plaintiff's Epstein patent. This patent was for a machine to develop
photocopies by means of the diffusion-transfer-reversal process (DTR).
In conjunction with other defenses, the defendant charged APECO with
violating the antitrust laws by charging exorbitant and oppressive
royalty rates which amounted to price fixing by in effect placing a
minimum price on the machines. The royalty was fixed at six per cent
of the retail price of the machine sold. The defendant contended this
amounted to a twenty-four per cent royalty because it equaled twelve
per cent of the manufacturing cost and the cost of the patented element
was one-half of the cost of manufacturing.
The court held that the patents were valid and infringed, that the
royalty was neither exorbitant nor oppressive, and that there was no
83. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) ; American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof
Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959) ; United States
v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
84. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 174 (1931).
The rate of royalties may, of course, be a decisive factor in the cost of
production. If combining patent owners effectively dominate an industry, the
power to fix and maintain royalties is tantamount to the power to fix prices....
Where domination exists, a pooling of competing process patents, or an exchange of licenses for the purpose of curtailing the manufacture and supply
of an unpatented product, is beyond the privileges conferred by the patents
and constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act.
85. 257 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 359 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1966).
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evidence of a restraint on competition .Since there is no restriction
against "unreasonably high royalties" and a patentee is free not to
license, the court reasoned a patentee is entitled to grant a license
"for any royalty" which is reasonably within the reward of the patent
grant. Licensing should be encouraged because it dilutes a monopoly
which would otherwise be complete. The court was influenced by the
lack of evidence that the bulk of the industry was involved and also
by the fact that there had been a decline in the selling price of the
machines.
The history and holding of this case should serve as a warning to
patentees of the situations in which exorbitant royalties may constitute
a misuse of the patent and violate the antitrust laws. Originally the
district court granted APECO a preliminary injunction pendente lite.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the case with instructions to
proceed to trial on the merits 6 and stated in dicta that an undisputed
showing of exorbitant and oppressive royalty rates involving the bulk of
the industry accompanied by an increase in selling price would constitute a misuse of the patent and a price-fixing in violation of the
antitrust laws. The court said exorbitant royalties would be contrary
to the public interest and cited Brulotte to support its holding of
unlawful enlargement of the patent monopoly. It is questionable
whether or not the court's reliance on Brulotte is justified because in
Brulotte the Supreme Court declined to invalidate the use of the patent
leverage to exact high royalties.8 7
In a case where there is evidence of domination and restraint, the
Supreme Court would probably follow the reasoning of the Seventh
Circuit. In dicta in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States,"
the Supreme Court said exorbitant royalties, agreed upon by patentees
in concert, may violate the antitrust laws when there is evidence that
the industry is dominated or interestate commerce is directly restrained.
The Court reasoned that since royalties could be a decisive factor in
the cost of production, the power to fix royalties was tantamount to the
power to fix prices. However, since this case involved an agreement
between cross-licensing patentees, there is some doubt that the Court
would be willing to apply this reasoning to a situation involving a
86. American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 359 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1966).
87. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate

with the leverage of that monopoly. But to use that leverage to project those
royalty payments beyond the life of the patent is analogous to an effort to
enlarge the monopoly of the patent by tieing the sale or use of the patented
article to the purchase or use of unpatented ones.
88. 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
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single patentee unless there was evidence of an agreement to fix prices.
If it is accepted that exorbitant royalties are really a method of
fixing prices, the courts should base their conclusions in exorbitant
royalty situations on the same reasoning applied in the patent pricefixing cases. Generally, in the absence of a patent or other statutory
authorization, vertical price fixing is a per se violation of the antitrust
laws.89 Since industry wide licensing agreements which are part of a
common plan to maintain prices in an entire industry through a network
of patent licenses are illegal, the Seventh Circuit's view would seem
to be valid. Thus a patentee who licenses the bulk of the industry at
exorbitant rates which result in increased or maintained prices would
violate the antitrust laws. Proof that the increased prices were a direct
result of dominance and of the exorbitant rates should be sufficient
evidence of a common plan between a patentee and his licensees to fix
prices. The patentee is able to coerce the licensee to agree in effect to
maintain prices when he agrees to pay the high royalties. This restriction on the patentee is justifiable because it prevents a patentee from
using exorbitant royalties to circumvent the patent price-fixing cases.
Analyzing the cases in the same manner as the price-fixing cases would
not prevent a patentee from charging as high a royalty as is consistent
with the true value 0 of his patent grant because the price-fixing
89. See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
When patents are involved, a distinction must be made between simple and complex
licensing agreements because a simple agreement does not violate the antitrust laws. A
simple price fixing agreement is one, "[w]here all that is involved is that 'A', holding a
patent covering a particular article of manufacture, licenses 'B' to make and sell that
article, he may impose a condition that 'B' shall not charge less for it than a price he
specifies." A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAws OF THE UNnxD STATES 263 (1960). See also
United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
However, the following complex agreements do violate the antitrust laws: (1) A
patentee cannot control the resale price of a product after the first sale. United States
v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942). (2) When there is a mutual agreement
among distributors of competing products, a patentee cannot control the licensee's
selling price. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942). (3) Patentees
participating in cross-licensing arrangements cannot fix the licensees' selling prices.
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). (4) Industry-wide licensing
agreements that are part of a common plan to stabilize prices in an entire industry
through a network of patent licenses are illegal. United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
90. The true value of a patent will be determined by the forces of supply and
demand. Also, when the patent royalty exceeds the cost of the pre-patent method or of a
substitute product or method, the market for the patent will decline and the patentee
will have to reduce his royalty back to its actual value. See American Photocopy
Equip. Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 192, 199 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd, 359 F.2d 745
(7th Cir. 1966). In this case the court said:
We cannot assume that there exist restrictions against "unreasonably high
royalties," absent any proof of favoritism or conspiracy to fix prices, . . . The
free competitive market place has built-in controls such as supply and demands
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cases require some evidence of an agreement to fix prices.9 ' In a
situation like APECO where there is no evidence of such an agreement,
the patentee is free to ".

.

. exact royalties as high as he can negotiate

with the leverage of that monopoly." 2
The cases involving alleged misuse of patents by reason of
royalty practices present the courts with a difficult choice between the
rights of patentees and the general aims of the antitrust laws. The
patentee should be entitled to obtain the maximum profits which are
consistent with the value of his contribution to society."3 However,
the constitutional grant of exclusive rights does not give the patentee
the right to restrain competition illegally. In attempting to satsify the
purpose of both laws, courts should proceed with caution so they do not
place burdens on a patentee which are not placed on non-patentees.
Larry R. Fisher
to limit the royalties charged by a prospective licensor. There is no indication

that further controls are justified.
91. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); Standard Oil Co.
(Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
92. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
93. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) ; United States v. General Elec. Co.,
272 U.S. 376 (1926); American Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d
769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).

